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 Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a new computing paradigm that brings 
cloud services to the network edge. Despite its great need in terms of 
computational services in daily life, service users may have several concerns 
while selecting a suitable service provider to fulfil their computational 
requirements. Such concerns are: with whom they are dealing with, where 
will their private data migrate to, service provider processing performance 
quality. Therefore, this paper presents a trust evaluation scheme that 
evaluates the processing performance of a service provider in the MEC 
environment. Processing performance of service providers is evaluated in 
terms of average processing success rate and processing throughput, thus 
allocating a service provider in a relevant trust status. Service provider 
processing incompliance and user termination ratio are also computed during 
provider’s interactions with users. This is in an attempt to help future service 
users to be acknowledged of service provider’s past interactions prior 
dealing with it. Thus, eliminating the probability of existing compromised 
service providers and raising the security and success of future interactions 
between service providers and users. Simulations results show service 
providers processing performance degree, processing incompliance and user 
termination ratio. A service provider is allocated to a trust status according 
to the evaluated processing performance trust degree. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a new emerging technology that extends the cloud computing 
capabilities to the network edge [1], by integrating MEC servers with the mobile network edge [2], through 
radio access network (RAN) [3], [4]. This permits direct mobile communication between the base network 
and end users [5], which allows low latency, better quality of service (QoS) [6], high bandwidth access to 
mobile applications and network information [7]. With the great evolution of mobile devices’ capabilities, 
their owners hold valuable information, apart from the devices’ configuration, such as real time knowledge 
and on-time location awareness of an event. Such mobile capabilities and information are considered great 
resources in terms of data analysis, processing, and storage media [8]. With the MEC network expansion [9], 
there is a great increase in service providers offering services. In this context, there could be different service 
providers offering similar service types, e.g., processing computation and/or storage, were each of them 
could have different processing performance quality. On the other hand, one service provider could offer 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2022: 2121-2138 
2122 
more than one service type [10]. However, not all services offered by the same service provider could have 
the same processing performance efficiency. Meanwhile, service users could require different functionalities 
and have different processing preferences, in terms of cost, storage capacity, processing performance quality 
and trust degree [11], [12].  
Given that, service providers are located in remote locations, most of them are unknown to service 
users. For this reason, service users hold several doubts such as, dealing with unknown service providers, 
user’s data privacy, service providers’ history and processing performance quality. This is mainly due to the 
lack of previous experience between service providers and users. This creates a level of uncertainty about the 
fulfilment of service users’ various computational needs and expectations, which limits users’ dependency on 
the MEC resources [13]. Many researchers had presented various attempts to build trusted relationships in 
edge computing paradigms [14]. This is to provide an efficient trust evaluation scheme for the available 
services provided by service providers, to secure future users’ interactions [15], [16]. In mobile edge 
computing, a secure multi-tier model was proposed in [17]. In this protocol, it was assumed that the higher 
degree of trust, the less security measures could be taken by a node and vice versa. But unfortunately, it did 
not consider sudden attacks occurring for a trusted node, such as hacking. A trust evaluation scheme was 
presented in [18], were it computes service providers’ identity, hardware capabilities and behavioral trust in 
the MEC network. The main limitation of this scheme is that it mainly depends on users’ feedback opinion to 
compute trust.  
An integrated trust evaluation model was depicted in [19], to evaluate service providers’ identity, 
historical behavior and quality of service offered. Trust computation was time consuming in this model, due 
to the complexity of the equations. In [20], a trust assessment protocol was developed that monitors and 
analyze traffic flow of interactions between service users and providers to evaluate trust. However, no 
performance parameters were evaluated. Another attempt to evaluate service providers’ performance during 
their interactions is the issuance of a service level agreement (SLA) [21]. An SLA is an agreed upon 
document between a service provider and user, that specifies the required task description and application 
requirements [22]. Yet, this is not sufficient to secure service users, since not all service providers abide to 
the SLA statements thoroughly. However, there is a lack of a standard SLA format. As shown, each of the 
previously mentioned protocols measured cloud services using different parameters. There is not a unified 
scheme that could evaluate service providers processing performance. Meanwhile, node history was not 
captured, which gives a chance for an entity to behave maliciously, knowing that it would not be recognized 
in the future. This increases service users’ fears and prevents them from relying on the cloud and edge 
computing paradigms to fulfil their computational needs.  
This paper presents a unified trustworthy evaluation model that evaluates service providers’ 
processing performance, to distinguish trustworthy providers. The main contributions of this paper are:  
i) service providers’ processing performance evaluation in terms of processing success ratio and throughput, 
ii) processing incompliance and user termination ratio computation of service providers, iii) development of a 
penalty system to track malicious actions committed by service providers, and iv) assignment of service 
providers to relative trust status. This would help service users in their service providers’ selection and 
optimizes the security of future interactions, which enhances the MEC network expansion [23]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; section 2, introduces the proposed architecture 
method, functional algorithms, and their description. Section 3 shows the results and discussion. Finally, the 
conclusion and future work are presented in section 4.  
 
 
2. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE METHOD 
The proposed architecture evaluates the processing performance of service providers in the MEC 
network. In this model, a service provider is evaluated according to its processing performance quality and 
not by the quantity of hardware or software resources that it possesses, e.g., storage space, number of 
processors and RAM. The main protocol entities, proposed functions, equations, and algorithms are 
described in subsection 2.1 to 2.6. 
 
2.1.  Main protocol entities and their equivalent tasks 
The main acting entities in the proposed scheme are service provider SP, service user SU, cloud 
broker (CB), network provider (NP) and cloud service manager (CSM) [24]. The relationship between the 
protocol entities is shown in Figure 1 and detailed below. 
− Service provider SPi: [25] a service provider “i”, i Є I, where I is the set of service providers. A service 
provider may be a small entity offering one service of one type, or a big organization that owns several 
hardware and software resources and offers several services of different job types. In case a service 
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provider SPi provides more than one service type, it is referred to as Sri. For simplicity, we will be referring 
to each service provider as Sri, throughout this paper. 
− Service user SUj: a service user “j”, j Є J, where J is the set of service users. A service user could be an 
entity or organization that requests a specific service to be performed over the network and pays for it [26]. 
− Cloud broker CBu: a cloud broker “u”, u Є U, where U is the set of cloud brokers. CB is an entity that 
mainly helps service users to find appropriate service providers to fulfil their computational needs, and it is 
being paid for this job. CB works as a local entity per area, where it should be aware of all available service 
providers and their offered service type. CB could communicate with other entities outside its area to reach 
suitable service providers [22]. CB is considered as a semi trusted entity that is not allowed to reveal 
service provider or service user private information, such as own opinion, as it could have a personal 
benefit. It also acts as a transmission and storage medium between service provider, user and CSM for 
certain encrypted information as shown below.  
− Cloud service manager (CSM): is considered a fully trusted authorized entity that is responsible for 
registering cloud brokers, service providers and service users to the MEC network through a network 
provider. CSM evaluates the processing performance and trust status of service providers [27]. It also 
checks the status and validity of cloud brokers periodically to ensure secure communication medium 
between service providers and users. Therefore, CSM should maintain high computational capabilities and 
covers a wide geographical region. 
− Network provider NPw: a network provider “w”, w Є W, where W is the set of network providers. NP is 
responsible for communication, data transmission and network efficiency, between all the above entities. 
Note that, there could be more than one network provider located per geographic area [12]. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Main protocol entities relationship 
 
 
However, a cloud broker, service provider or service user could deal with more than one network 
provider [28]. While a service provider could accept jobs from more than one cloud broker, a service user can 
also deal with more than one cloud broker to request different computational tasks. All of the above entities 
are authenticated in the MEC network by their unique identity, which is out of the scope of this paper. 
 
2.2.  List of assumptions 
The proposed scheme considers the following assumptions:  
a) There are three job types requested over the MEC network; type 1: storage request (storing massive 
terabytes, e.g., videos), type 2: computational processing request (jobs that require high processing 
speed/capabilities), type 3: requesting both of them. These jobs are the most commonly requested 
processes in the cloud computing paradigm and MEC network;  
b) If the same service provider 𝑆𝑃𝑖  offers more than one job type, known as 𝑆𝑟𝑖 , were r Є {type 1, type 2, 
type 3}. This does not mean that SP has the same computational efficiency for all job types. For instance, 
it could be powerful in one job type, e.g., storage, and weak in another, e.g., processing efficiency or vice 
versa;  
c) The same service provider 𝑆𝑃𝑖  gives equal usage and benefits of its hardware and software resources to 
all its services and users;  
d) Job processing, storage and execution isolation is considered as a default action by a service provider 
[29];  
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e) Since each service user could have different priorities and intentions, the proposed scheme asks the 
service user for a priority list of preferences and responds with a recommendation list accordingly;  
f) Batch processing is assumed for trust computation. All processes of the same job type per service 
provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖 are gathered per computational interval (e.g., month);  
g) Trust evaluation is performed per process accepted by 𝑆𝑟𝑖; 8) A network provider of each of 𝑆𝑟𝑖, 𝑆𝑈𝑗 and 
𝐶𝐵𝑢, have a limited contribution in the proposed scheme as discussed below.  
 
2.3.  Processing performance computational equations  
The proposed trust scheme measures the processing performance P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) of service provider 𝑆𝑃𝑖  
which could own more than one service 𝑆𝑟𝑖. However, jobs of the same type, are evaluated per service 
provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖, as mentioned previously. Noting that, P consists of different weighted parameters and computed 
by the CSM, as described below. 
Let each requested job of any type be known as process “a”, a Є A, where A is the total number of 
processes executed at 𝑆𝑟𝑖, but distinguished by their job type. Each process “a” has a separate service level 
agreement, even if it is performed by the same 𝑆𝑃𝑖/𝑆𝑟𝑖. Assume the components of an SLA of process “a” 
executed by 𝑆𝑟𝑖 be processing cost (𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑎), storage capacity GB/TB (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑎), duration of maintenance hr/min 
(𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑎), and agreed estimated execution time hr/min (𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎) [30]. All SLA’s components are rated by 𝑆𝑈𝑗 
after the job is ended or terminated [31]. The proposed scheme constitutes of eight equations, as detailed below. 
Let 𝑇𝑣 be actual processing execution time of process “a” at 𝑆𝑟𝑖, where “a” start time is 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡  and end 
time is 𝑃𝑎𝑒𝑡. Hence, 
 
𝑇𝑣= 𝑃𝑎𝑒𝑡 − 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡  (1) 
 
Assume the time difference between the estimated agreed time 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎 and actual processing execution time 𝑇𝑣, 
be 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 (Time compliance), therefore, 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎= 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎 − 𝑇𝑣  (2) 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 =  [
≥ 0 "𝑎" completed within SEia
< 0 SEia time incompliance 
] 
 
Given that each process “a” should end in one of the following four states {PE1, PE2, PT1, PT2}: 
 
[
PE1 Process ended by Sri complete
PE2 Process ended by Sri incomplete] 
[
PT1  Process terminated by SUj Tv > SEia
PT2 Process terminated by SUj Tv < SEia]        
 
Let 𝑃𝐸1_𝑇,𝑃𝐸2_𝑇, 𝑃𝑇1_𝑇 and  𝑃𝑇2_𝑇 be the total number of  𝑃𝐸1, 𝑃𝐸2, 𝑃𝑇1 and  𝑃𝑇2 respectively. Let 
the rated SLA, be 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅, and the total number of 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 implies the total number of ended 
jobs/processes, “A”. Therefore, the average processing success rate 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖) can be measured by, 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖) = 
  𝑃𝐸1_𝑇
𝐴
  (3) 
 
On the other hand, processing incompliance 𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖) or failure ratio, can be calculated as,  
 
𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖) = 
𝑃𝐸2_𝑇+𝑃𝑇1_𝑇 
𝐴
   (4) 
 
The user termination ratio 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖) can be measured by, 
 
𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 
 𝑃𝑇2_𝑇
 𝐴
  (5) 
 
In case 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖) exceeds a certain threshold, a warning is issued to alarm the relevant service 
provider of its high user termination ratio. The processing throughput PT(𝑺𝒓𝒊) will be measured by 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
 A trust evaluation scheme of service providers in mobile edge computing (Merrihan Badr Monir Mansour) 
2125 
considering the number of completed successful processes 𝑃𝐸1, per computational interval and given certain 
points for each range of values by, 
 
PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖)= Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖) (6) 
 
for 1 ≤ PE1_T    // Function F3. 
After all, the processing performance of a service provider P(𝑺𝒓𝒊) will be computed as,  
 
P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) =
𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖)+ PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖)
2
 (7) 
 
Noting that the total number of processes executed, “A”, at service provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖 of 𝑆𝑃𝑖 , per computational 
interval, equals; 
 
A = 𝑃𝐸1_𝑇+𝑃𝐸2_T+𝑃𝑇1_𝑇+𝑃𝑇2_𝑇 (8) 
 
as process “a”, should end in one of these four states. The processing capacity 𝑃𝐶𝑖 of a service provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖, 
is a predetermined value by the service provider specified during the registration process. Each of the above 
equations is applied in the below functional algorithms, as part of the trust computation process. 
 
2.4.  Functional algorithms and description  
The proposed protocol is composed of eleven functional algorithms, which leads to measuring the 
processing performance of a service provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖 and assigning it to a trust status. It also measures the 
processing incompliance and user termination ratio per service provider. A penalty system is also presented 
to identify any malicious action performed by the participating entities. Table 1 shows each function name 
and aim, the consequent action performed with the relevant algorithm figure number. Figure 2 presents the 
protocol architecture and the relationship between the eleven functions. Dashed lines indicate that this 
function may or may not be called.  
 
 
Table 1. Proposed scheme functions 
Function 
name 
Aim Action performed Algorithm 
no. 
F0 Service provider registration 
function. 
Service provider registered to MEC network if it is not 
previously registered in network. 
1 
F1 Job request and execution 
protocol. 
Job processed by service provider. 2 
F2 Cloud broker computation of total 
𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅, “A” for each service 
provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 
“A” computed per service provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 3 
F3 Processing throughout 
computation for each 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 
PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖) computed. 10 
F4 
 
Processing performance 
evaluation for 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 
P(Sri), PI(Sri), 𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑎𝑔𝑒, UTR(Sri) & 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖) computed. 9 
F5 Trust status computation function 
for 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 
Tn(Sri) computed. 11 
F6 Cloud broker checks 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 
validity. 
Penalty E1_SUj is set to true or false accordingly. 4 
F7 Complain function against service 
provider 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 
Cloud broker stops sending new job_request to 𝑺𝒓𝒊 until 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 
correction is sent by it. 
5 
Penalty Functions 
E1 𝑆𝑈𝑗 did not send 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅. All job requests by 𝑆𝑈𝑗 are rejected until it sends 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅. 6 
E2 𝑆𝑟𝑖 attempt to register again as a 
new provider in the network. 
P(Sri) is decreased in the first attempt. While 𝑆𝑟𝑖 is temporarily 
blocked from accessing the network for X-days in the later 
attempts by penalty “E5”. 
7 
E3 Lazy or compromised cloud 
broker. 
Generates W1 or W2 in the first and second attempts. While 
CBu is temporarily blocked from accessing the network for X-
days by penalty “E4”. 
8 
 
 
2.5.  Proposed penalty protocol 
The penalty protocol is presented as part of the proposed architecture. It mainly aims to track service 
providers malicious actions, which helps in their processing performance and trust status computation 
process. However, the penalty protocol achieves the following: i) it shows the type of wrong action 
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performed by the involved entity; ii) it encounters several malicious action types expected to happen, such as 
an existing service provider attempt to register as a new one, in order to hide its bad history; iii) it counts the 
number and type of malicious actions performed per computational interval; and iv) imposes a penalty 
according to each malicious action type performed by the accused entity.  
The penalty scheme also monitors cloud brokers and service users’ actions in a limited manner, 
since this is out of the scope of this paper. This provides more secure transactions between service providers, 
users, and cloud brokers in the MEC environment. Table 2 states each penalty name, its description, and 
consequences. All of the above functions are described in the following subsections with their relevant 
algorithms. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Functions relationship diagram 
 
 
Table 2. Penalties and their consequences 
 
 
2.6.  Functional algorithms 
In this section, each of the above mentioned functions in Table 1, are described below with their 
relative algorithms. The penalty functional algorithms are also detailed below, together with their generated 
warnings, and actions performed accordingly. 
 
2.6.1. Service provider registration  
A service provider 𝑆𝑃𝑖  could own more than one service, thus service registration to the MEC 
network is performed per service 𝑆𝑟𝑖 {job type 1, 2, or 3} of service provider 𝑆𝑃𝑖 , with the aid of a network 
Penalty name Description Consequences 
E1_𝑆𝑈𝑖 
𝑆𝑈𝑖 did not send to 𝐶𝐵𝑢 rated(𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) after process 
ended/terminated. 
Job request rejected until sending the pending 
𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅. 
E2_𝑆𝑟𝑖 𝑆𝑟𝑖 first attempt to register again in the MEC network. Request rejected, 𝑃(𝑆𝑟𝑖) decreased. 
E3_CBu 
Cloud broker CBu exceeded end of month batch computation for 
𝑆𝑟𝑖 for one or two attempts. 
Cloud broker receives warning W1 or W2 from 
CSM accordingly. 
E4_CBu 
Third attempt of cloud broker to delay its computational job, 
after being warned by “E3”. Compromised CBu. 
Cloud broker is temporarily blocked from the 
network by CSM. 
E5_𝑆𝑟𝑖 
𝑆𝑟𝑖 second attempt to register again in the MEC network, after 
being warned by “E2”. Compromised 𝑆𝑟𝑖. 
Service provider is temporarily blocked from 
the network by CSM, for X-days. 
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provider. Algorithm1, shows the service provider registration algorithm 1, function F0, and its flowchart in 
Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Service provider registration flowchart 
 
 
Algorithm 1: Service provider registration-function F0 
Algorithm code: F0 
Description: Service provider registration function.  
Executed at CSM. 
1. 
2. 
Input: new 𝑆𝑟𝑖 of 𝑆𝑃𝑖  needs to register to MEC network. 
Output: registered 𝑆𝑟𝑖 of 𝑆𝑃𝑖. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
𝑆𝑃𝑖→𝑁𝑃𝑤: join_request of 𝑆𝑟𝑖 of 𝑆𝑃𝑖 
𝑁𝑃𝑤→CSM: join_request of 𝑆𝑟𝑖 of 𝑆𝑃𝑖 ,  
where join_request includes job_type = (storage, processing, or both & 𝑃𝐶𝑖_value) 
CSM: checks 
    if 𝑆𝑟𝑖 exists then 
           execute Penalty Function E2 
           exit () 
    else 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
       CSM:   
        issues identity_Sri    // 𝑆𝑟𝑖 unique credentials 
        computes 
        P(Sri)=0,  To(Sri)= “Beginner”, // To(Sri)= initial trust status of Sri 
        assigns 𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑆𝑟𝑖)=value 
        𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ = Current_date,   // birth date= registration day 
        𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑎𝑔𝑒= 0   // initial state   // age of Sri 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
       CSM→𝑁𝑃𝑤:  
        𝑁𝑃𝑤→𝑆𝑟𝑖:  (𝐸𝑛(identity_Sri, P(Sri) = 0, To(Sri)=  
            “Beginner”, 𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ , 𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑆𝑟𝑖)) SPi𝑃𝑢)    
                          //encrypted by the public key of 𝑆𝑃𝑖 
        𝑁𝑃𝑤→𝐶𝐵𝑢: new 𝑆𝑟𝑖+ job_type+𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑆𝑟𝑖)        
                        // 𝑁𝑃𝑤informs 𝐶𝐵𝑢 of new 𝑆𝑟𝑖  
    endif 
27. end 
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By the completion of function F0, a new service 𝑆𝑟𝑖  of service provider 𝑆𝑃𝑖 , is now registered to the 
MEC network, with a unique identity number to be authenticated and distinguished among other service 
providers. Service provider’s unique identity is issued and saved by the CSM. On the other hand, a network 
provider should have a list of all available registered service providers and must exchange it with other 
network providers, if any exists, within the same region. A network provider also must continuously update 
cloud brokers with the newly registered or deactivated service providers. Cloud brokers by return, will be 
aware and updated with service providers’ status in their own area, which enhances service provider selection 
process by users. This minimizes the communication overhead between the participating entities in the MEC 
network.  
 
2.6.2. Job request scenario algorithm 
Algorithm 2, shows the job request scenario algorithm steps. A service user is expected to request 
one of the previously mentioned job types from a cloud broker, which in return searches for an appropriate 
service provider. If 𝑆𝑈𝑗 did not send rated SLA for its previously ended job in the MEC network, this user is 
penalized by being prohibited from requesting further jobs through function E1, described in section 2.6.4, 
until it sends the required rated SLA. Otherwise, 𝐶𝐵𝑢 asks 𝑆𝑈𝑗 to choose from a priority list its preferences, 
as shown in algorithm 2. Upon 𝑆𝑈𝑗 feedback, 𝐶𝐵𝑢 sends a recommendation list of available service 
providers, with respect to the chosen priorities [32]. 𝑆𝑈𝑗 chooses a service provider and informs the 𝐶𝐵𝑢 of 
its choice.  
Consequently, 𝐶𝐵𝑢 checks the chosen service provider processing capacity 𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑆𝑟𝑖) limit. If 
𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑆𝑟𝑖) is not maximum, the cloud broker starts direct communication between the service provider and 
user. Given that, each job will have a separate SLA, chosen 𝑆𝑟𝑖  sends an initial SLA, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝐼, to 𝑆𝑈𝑗 for 
approval. Upon SLA approval by both parties, requested job processing starts, were 𝑆𝑟𝑖 informs 𝑆𝑈𝑗 of the 
job start time; 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 . Job processing is ended or terminated in one of the previously mentioned four states, 
(𝑃𝐸1, 𝑃𝐸2, 𝑃𝑇1, 𝑃𝑇2) by either the 𝑆𝑟𝑖 or 𝑆𝑈𝑗. Consequent steps take place accordingly as stated in Figure 2. In 
all cases, 𝑆𝑈𝑗 should send rated 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅.  
While TRia (time compliance, equation 2), is computed by 𝑆𝑟𝑖, it should be approved by 𝑆𝑈𝑗 within 
a time threshold, to avoid holding an opened transaction for a long time intentionally by any entity. In case, 
𝑆𝑈𝑗 requests TRia correction, 𝑆𝑟𝑖 should reply with the corrected TRiawithin a time threshold, otherwise 
complain function F7 (detailed in section 2.6.3) is called. Upon TRia, agreement, function F6 (algorithm 4) is 
called to check the validity of rated 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 (depicted in section 2.6.3). The rated 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 is encrypted by 
the public key of the CSM, which will handle trust computation process. This is performed using asymmetric 
encryption techniques, such as public key infrastructure (PKI) [33]. Using PKI, ensures secure trust 
computation, information integrity and confidentiality, while securing future user interactions [34]. 
 
Algorithm 2: Job request processing scenario-function F1. 
Algorithm code: F1() 
Description: Job Request and Execution Protocol 
1. Input: job_request by 𝑆𝑈𝑗. 
2. Output: job_request of 𝑆𝑈𝑗 executed. 
3. 𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝐶𝐵𝑢 ∶ job_request = job_type: (storage | processing | both)                
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
𝐶𝐵𝑢: checks 
     if  E1_𝑆𝑈𝑗 = true then 
         execute Penalty function E1 // lazy 𝑆𝑈𝑗 
         exit ()    
      endif    
9. 𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑈𝑗: priority_list of job_type 
10.     where priority_list = (𝑃(𝑆𝑟𝑖) | storage capacity) 
11. 𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝐶𝐵𝑢: returned priority_list answer 
12. 𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑈𝑗: recommendation_list of 𝑆𝑟𝑖 with respect to priority_list answer 
13. 𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝐶𝐵𝑢: chosen 𝑆𝑟𝑖 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
𝐶𝐵𝑢: checks  
        if  PC(𝑆𝑟𝑖) = maximum then 
            chosen 𝑆𝑟𝑖 rejected  
            return to step 12, excluding chosen 𝑆𝑟𝑖 
         else 
19. 
20. 
            𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑟𝑖: job_request of 𝑆𝑈𝑗 
        endif 
21. 
22. 
23. 
𝑆𝑟𝑖  :  
        if 𝑆𝑟𝑖 refuses job_request then 
           𝑆𝑟𝑖→𝐶𝐵𝑢: job_request rejected 
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24. 
25. 
              return to step 12, excluding chosen 𝑆𝑟𝑖 
        else 
26. 
27. 
           𝑆𝑟𝑖→𝑆𝑈𝑗: 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_I for approval 
               where 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_I = (𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎,𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑎,𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑎, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑎)  // initial SLA 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
           𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝐶𝐵𝑢: 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_I 
         endif 
𝐶𝐵𝑢:         
     if 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_I = approved then 
           𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑟𝑖: approved 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_I 
     else 
           return to step 12, excluding chosen 𝑆𝑟𝑖 
     endif 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
𝑆𝑟𝑖: assigns  
        job_type of 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_I to “a” 
        issues 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 
                 where 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡=(start_date_time of process “a”) 
40. 𝑆𝑟𝑖→𝑆𝑈𝑗: 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 // informs 𝑆𝑈𝑗 of start of processing 
Case 1: Service provider ends job_request 
41. 𝑆𝑟𝑖→𝑆𝑈𝑗: 𝑃𝐸 
42. 
43. 
     where  𝑃𝐸 = 𝑃𝐸1| 𝑃𝐸2= (𝑃𝑎𝑒𝑡, 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎, 𝑇𝑣, 𝑃𝑎𝑒𝑡, 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡)  
                & 𝑃𝑎𝑒𝑡= (end_date & time of process 𝑎𝑜) 
44.     𝑆𝑈𝑗: checks      // within time_threshold  
45.       if   𝑇𝑣 = approved then 
46. 
47. 
48. 
           𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝐶𝐵𝑢: (𝐸𝑛 (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢),  
           where (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎,𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑎,𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑎, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑎)+ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎_true+𝑃𝐸1|𝑃𝐸2 
           execute Function F6 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
      else    // 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎_false 
           𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝑆𝑟𝑖: requests 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 correction, 
            wait for corrected 𝑃𝐸,  
          if received within time_threshold then 
             return to step 44 
         else  
           execute Function F7 // complain function against 𝑆𝑟𝑖 
         endif  
      endif 
Case 2: Service user terminates job_request 
58. 
59. 
𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝑆𝑟𝑖: 𝑃𝑇 
       where 𝑃𝑇 = 𝑃𝑇1 | 𝑃𝑇2= (process termination request) 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
      𝑆𝑟𝑖:  
        computes 𝑇𝑣 & 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 
     𝑆𝑟𝑖→𝑆𝑈𝑗: 𝑇𝑣 & 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 
        𝑆𝑈𝑗: checks 
            if  𝑇𝑣 = approved then 
                 𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝐶𝐵𝑢: (𝐸𝑛 (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢),  
                 where (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎,𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑎,𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑎, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑎)+ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎_true +𝑃𝑇1|𝑃𝑇2         
                 execute Function F6                                                                                           
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
            else           //  𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎_false 
              𝑆𝑈𝑗→𝑆𝑟𝑖: requests 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 correction, 
               wait for corrected 𝑃𝑇,  
             if received within time_threshold then 
                return to step 63 
            else  
               execute Function F7// complain function 
           endif  
         endif  
77. 
78. 
          𝐶𝐵𝑢: executes Function F2 
      endif  
79. end 
 
Upon the completion of function F1, 𝐶𝐵𝑢 gathers all rated SLAs of 𝑆𝑟𝑖, per computational interval 
and starts its computation process as described below. 
 
2.6.3. Cloud broker computational algorithms 
Functions (F2, F6 and F7) are executed by the cloud broker, as explained below. In Function F2 
presented in algorithm 3, 𝐶𝐵𝑢 is responsible to collect all the rated 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 per 𝑆𝑟𝑖, counts and sends them as 
a batch of rated SLA’s (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛) to the CSM periodically for trust computation. This batch is sent 
encrypted by the public key of the CSM and stamped with the date of F2 function execution “𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎”. 
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Algorithm 3: Cloud broker computational-function F2 
Algorithm code: F2. 
Description: Cloud broker computational function. 
Executed by the cloud broker. 
1. Input: 𝐸𝑛 (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢  per Sri 
2. Output: Batch of (𝐸𝑛 (A, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢) + 𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 per Sri    // 𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 date of computation 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
let (𝐸𝑛 (𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢) be referred to as 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅n 
𝐶𝐵𝑢: 
       A= count 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛 
       assign 𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 to current_date 
𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝐶𝑆𝑀: Batch of (𝐸𝑛 (A, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢) + 𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎  
8. end 
 
Algorithm 4 of Function F6, is called by function F1, where 𝐶𝐵𝑢 checks if 𝑆𝑈𝑗 had sent rated SLA 
of its last transaction. If not, then 𝐶𝐵𝑢 executes penalty function E1 to penalize 𝑆𝑈𝑗, for its laziness. Function 
F7 presented in algorithm 5, is called by function F1, where a 𝐶𝐵𝑢 checks whether 𝑆𝑟𝑖 had sent corrected 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 or not, within a time_threshold. If not sent, 𝐶𝐵𝑢 broadcasts message 𝑀𝑇𝑅 accordingly to all network 
providers, in order to stop dealing with the relevant 𝑆𝑟𝑖 until sending corrected 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎. The network provider 
broadcasts 𝑀𝑇𝑅 to other cloud brokers as stated in algorithm 5. 
 
Algorithm 4: Cloud broker checks SLA_R validity 
Algorithm code: F6 
Description: Cloud broker checks 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅. 
Executed by cloud broker. 
1. Input: 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 
2. Output: E1_SUj = true or E1_SUj = false 
3.  𝐶𝐵𝑢:                
4.         if 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 = null then     // did not send 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 
5.             generate  E1_SUj = true 
6.             execute Penalty function E1 
7.         else  
8.             E1_SUj = false 
9.         endif 
10. end 
 
Algorithm 5: Cloud broker complain function against service provider 
Algorithm code: F7 
Description: Complain function against service provider.  
Executed by cloud broker. 
1. Input: 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 correction=null. 
2. Output: Cloud broker stops sending new job_request of any 
3. SUj to Sri. 
4. 𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑟𝑖: requests 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 correction 
5. 𝐶𝐵𝑢: stops sending new job_request to 𝑆𝑟𝑖 until 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 
6. correction sent 
7. 𝐶𝐵𝑢→NPw: broadcast MTR 
8.         where MTR=(pending 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 correction, no new  
9. job_requests) 
10. NPw→CB: broadcast MTR 
11. end 
 
2.6.4. Penalties computational algorithms 
Three penalty functions (E1, E2, E3) introduced in algorithms 6, 7 and 8 respectively, are described 
below. Algorithm 6 describes penalty function E1, which is called by function F6, in case 𝑆𝑈𝑗 did not send 
rated 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅. In this function, a network provider broadcasts warning message 𝑀𝑆𝐿𝐴 to all cloud brokers, to 
warn them not to accept any job requests from 𝑆𝑈𝑗 until sending the rated 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 as shown in algorithm 6.  
 
Algorithm 6: Penalty function E1 
Algorithm code: E1. 
Description: Service user denied sending rated SLA.  
Executed by cloud broker. 
1. Input: E1_SUj=true. 
2. Output: requests 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅, job_request rejected 
3. CBu:          
4.       job_request rejected of SUj 
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5.       CBu→NPw(SUj): MSLA  
6.   where MSLA=(pending 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅, job_request rejected)                              
7.       NPw(SUj)→ CB: broadcasts  MSLA to nearby CBu, ∀ u, 
8.       CB→ SUj: E1_SUj, requests 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅 
9. end 
 
Algorithm 7 presents penalty function E2, were it’s called by function F0, in case CSM discovers 
that a previously registered 𝑆𝑟𝑖, is trying to register as a new provider to the MEC network. Hence, CSM 
imposes penalty E2, which decreases 𝑆𝑟𝑖 processing performance value, in the first attempt. In case this 
action is repeated again, malicious 𝑆𝑟𝑖 is temporarily blocked from accessing the MEC network by penalty 
E5. Consequently, CSM sends warning message 𝑀𝑦 to the involved 𝐶𝐵𝑢 and requests from it to find a 
replacement service provider, to delegate malicious 𝑆𝑟𝑖 tasks to a newly selected provider. 𝐶𝐵𝑢 broadcasts 
this message to other cloud brokers and service providers, in order not to deal with malicious service provider 
temporarily.  
 
Algorithm 7: Penalty function E2 
Algorithm code: Penalty function E2. 
Description: Service provider re-register attempt to MEC network.  
Executed by CSM. 
1. Input: E2_Sri 
2. Output: P(Sri) decreased or system temporarily block for accused Sri. 
3. CSM:      
4.           join_request rejected 
5.           generate E2_(𝑆𝑟𝑖) // Penalty E2 
6.           count E2_Sri++  
7.           if  E2_Sri =1 then 
8.                  P(Sri)= P(Sri)-0.01 
9.                   execute function F5                 
10.                   CSM→𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑟𝑖:(𝐸𝑛(P(Sri), Tn(Sri) 𝑆𝑟𝑖𝑃𝑢) 
11.           elseif 
12.                   E2_Sri > 1 then 
13.                   generate E5_Sri1  // system temporarily block from the network of 
Sri1 for X-days 
14.                   CSM→𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑟𝑖1 : E5_𝑆𝑟𝑖1  
15.                   CSM→𝐶𝐵𝑢(Sri): requests new Sri2 selection|| My  
16.                   where My=[compromised Sri1] 
17.                   𝐶𝐵𝑢(Sri) → CB & Sr: broadcasts  My to nearby 𝐶𝐵𝑢 & Sri, ∀ i & u           
18.           CBu: selects Sri2 
19.           𝐶𝐵𝑢→ Sri2: job_delegation_request || My  
20.            where job_delegation_request=(job_request)     
21.     endif 
22. end 
 
On the other hand, penalty function E3, shown in algorithm 8, is called by function F4, in two cases; 
case1: a 𝐶𝐵𝑢 postpones sending the total number 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅, “A”, per 𝑆𝑟𝑖; case2: 𝐶𝐵𝑢 adjusts its computation 
time (𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎) as a malicious action, during its processing of function F2. In both cases, the 𝐶𝐵𝑢 is claimed to 
be accused. 𝐶𝐵𝑢 is warned by warning number “W1”, and a message is sent to it by the CSM. If one of these 
actions is repeated again, CSM sends warning number “W2” to the accused 𝐶𝐵𝑢. If the 𝐶𝐵𝑢 performs any of 
these malicious actions for the third time, then penalty E4 is imposed by CSM, which deactivates 𝐶𝐵𝑢 from 
accessing the MEC network for a predefined time (X-days). 
 
Algorithm 8: Penalty function E3 
Algorithm code: E3. 
Description: Monitoring cloud broker actions.  
Executed by CSM. 
1. Input: E3_CBu. 
2. Output: W1_CBu or W2_CBu or system temporarily block for CBu. 
3. CSM:               
4.         generate E3_CBu 
5.            count E3_CBu++ 
6.                if   E3_CBu =1 then  
7.                     generate  W1_CBu 
8.                     CSM→CBu: W1_CBu 
9.               elseif 
10.                    E3_CBu =2 
11.                    generate W2_CBu 
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12.                    CSM→CBu: W2_CBu 
13.               else 
14.                  generate E4_CBu1 
15.                  CSM→CBu: E4_CBu1 
16.                  CSM: performs system temporarily block from the network of CBu1 for X-
days 
17.                  requests all stored (𝐸𝑛 (A, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢) from CBu1 
18.                  CSM→NPw(CBu): requests new CBu2 selection || Mx  
19.                        where Mx=[compromised CBu1] 
20.                        NPw(CBu): selects nearby CBu2  
21.                        NPw(CBu)→ CBu2: Mx       
22.                        NPw(CBu)→CSM: newly selected CBu2 
23.                        CBu2→ 𝑆𝑟𝑖 & 𝑆𝑈𝑗:broadcasts Mx 
24.             endif 
25.end 
 
In case of 𝐶𝐵𝑢 deactivation, CSM requests from the involved network provider to find a subsequent 
cloud broker and delegates all its functions to the newly selected cloud broker, which continues all the 
pending jobs. It also broadcasts a warning message (Mx) to all surrounding service providers and users, to 
inform them of the compromised 𝐶𝐵𝑢. As shown, the penalty functions update the participating entities in 
case a malicious participant is discovered, where this entity is banned from accessing the MEC network. This 
optimizes the security of interactions on the MEC network. 
 
2.6.5. Trust computational algorithms 
Figure 4 shows the processing performance computation steps of 𝑆𝑟𝑖. Upon completion of function 
F2 by the cloud broker, the processing performance evaluation of 𝑆𝑟𝑖, function F4 presented in algorithm 9, is 
executed by the CSM per computational interval, given that “A > 0” (𝑆𝑟𝑖 had received jobs). In case a service 
provider is working with more than one cloud broker, CSM could authenticate each provider by its unique 
identity. Function F4 calls two other functions; function F3 (algorithm 10) for processing throughput 
computation, and function F5 (algorithm 11), that evaluates service provider trust status. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Processing performance computation function-F4 
 
 
Trust evaluation and all its parameters are evaluated by the CSM for three main reasons: 1- to 
ensure accurate and fair trust computation for service providers, 2- to guarantee service provider data security 
and confidentiality, 3- it helps service requesters to reveal trust values remotely prior starting their 
interactions. 𝑆𝑟𝑖 age is computed to show its processing lifetime in the MEC network. Trust computation 
begins by computing 𝑃𝐸1_T, 𝑃𝐸2_𝑇, 𝑃𝑇1_T, 𝑃𝑇2_T. Each of these parameters indicates the final status per 
process “a” received by 𝑆𝑟𝑖. While the computed time difference 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 ≥ 0, the average processing success 
rate 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖) is computed. This is because there could be successful processes, in spite that 𝑆𝑟𝑖 had exceeded 
the estimated agreed time 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑎, but the service user had been patient enough. Therefore, this case is not 
considered as a fully successful job and could indicate that the predetermined processing capacity is not 
accurate for this 𝑆𝑟𝑖. However, this raises the processing throughput value for 𝑆𝑟𝑖 computed by function F3, 
algorithm 10.  
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While the processing incompliance 𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖) and user termination ratio 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖) are computed, in 
case 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖) exceeds user termination threshold, a warning is generated and sent to the relevant 𝑆𝑟𝑖  via the 
𝐶𝐵𝑢. This is to alarm 𝑆𝑟𝑖 of its high user termination ratio. Consequently, the processing performance P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) 
is computed, then function F5 is executed, to get 𝑆𝑟𝑖 trust status. These results are encrypted by CSM and 
sent to 𝑆𝑟𝑖 via its 𝐶𝐵𝑢. Processing throughput computation, function F3 (algorithm 10), is computed based on 
the number of successful processes  𝑃𝐸1_𝑇 executed by 𝑆𝑟𝑖, (equation (6)). Based on the computed processing 
performance P(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑆𝑟𝑖  is assigned one of six trust states by function F5, as shown in algorithm 11.  
 
Algorithm 9: Processing performance computation-function F4 
Algorithm code: F4. 
Description:  Processing performance computation function.  
Executed by CSM. 
1. Input: (𝐸𝑛 (𝐴, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢) + 𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 
2. Output:  P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) computed 
3.  𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝐶𝑆𝑀: batch of (𝐸𝑛 (𝐴, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢) + 𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 
4. CSM: 
5.   decrypt (𝐸𝑛 (𝐴, 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑎_𝑅𝑛) 𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑢)  
6.     if  𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 exceeded last_day of month then 
7.          execute Penalty function E3 
8.    endif 
9.             if  𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑎 ≥ 𝑃𝑎𝑒𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 then 
10.                  for a=1 to A 
11.                   compute 
12.                      𝑃𝐸1_T, 𝑃𝐸2_𝑇, 𝑃𝑇1_T, 𝑃𝑇2_T,  
13.                      𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑎𝑔𝑒= Current_date  - 𝑆𝑟𝑖_𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ 
14.                        if  𝑃𝐸1_T ≥1 then 
15.                          execute Function F3    // compute  PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖) 
16.                             if  𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑎 ≥ 0 then 
17.                                compute 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖) =
  𝑃𝐸1_𝑇
𝐴
        // equation (3) 
18.                             endif 
19.                       elseif  𝑃𝐸2_𝑇≥ 1 or 𝑃𝑇1_T ≥ 1  
20.                          compute 𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖) = 
𝑃𝐸2_𝑇+𝑃𝑇1_𝑇
𝐴
        // equation (4) 
21.                      elseif   𝑃𝑇2_T ≥ 1 
22.                         compute 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 
 𝑃𝑇2_𝑇
 𝐴
             // equation (5) 
23.                          if 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖) ≥ user termination threshold then  
24.                             generate W1_Sri 
25.                             CSM→ 𝐶𝐵𝑢:  W1_Sri 
26.                             𝐶𝐵𝑢→Sri:  W1_Sri 
27.                          endif 
28.                     else 
29.                          PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖)=0, 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖)=0, 𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖)=0, 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖)=0 
30.                    endif 
31.             endfor 
32.         else  
33.           𝐶𝐵𝑢=compromised  
34.           execute Penalty function E3            
35.         endif  
36. compute  P(Sri)    // equation (7) 
37. execute function F5  
38. CSM→𝐶𝐵𝑢: (𝐸𝑛 (PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖), P(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖), Tn(Sri)) 𝑆𝑟𝑖𝑃𝑢) & 
39.                      (𝐸𝑛 (P(Sri), Tn(Sri)) 𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑃𝑢) 
41. 𝐶𝐵𝑢→𝑆𝑟𝑖: (𝐸𝑛 (PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖), P(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑃𝐼(𝑆𝑟𝑖), 𝑈𝑇𝑅(𝑆𝑟𝑖), Tn(Sri)) 𝑆𝑟𝑖𝑃𝑢) 
42. end 
 
Algorithm 10: Processing throughput computation-function F3 
Algorithm code: F3. 
Description: Processing throughput computation function. 
Executed by CSM. 
1.  Input: PE1_T. 
2.  Output: PT(Sri) // processing throughput computation per computational interval for 
Sri. 
3.   CSM :  
4.       if (PE1_T ≤ 5,000)      then  
5.          Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = Ceil (PE1_T/10,000) 
6.          elseif (PE1_T ≤ 10,000) then 
7.              Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 0.6 
8.              elseif (PE1_T ≤ 100,000) then 
9.               Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 0.7 
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10.               elseif  (PE1_T ≤ 1,000,000) then 
11.                  Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 0.8 
12.                  else if  (PE1_T ≤ 10,000,000) then 
13.                     Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 0.9 
14.                     else 
15.                        Points(𝑆𝑟𝑖)  = 1 
16.                       return PT(Sri)= Points(Sri)   
17.      endif 
18.   end 
 
Algorithm 11: Trust status computation algorithm-function F5 
Algorithm code: F5. 
Description: Trust status computation function. 
Executed by CSM. 
1. Input: P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) 
2. Output: Tn(Sri) 
3. CSM: 
4.           If P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) ≤0 then 
5.                   Tn(Sri)= “untrusted service provider” 
6.               elseif P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) ≤ 0.3 then 
7.                       Tn(Sri)= “weak service provider” 
8.               elseif P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) ≤ 0.5 then 
9.                       Tn(Sri)= “average service provider” 
10.               elseif P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) ≤ 0.7 then 
11.                       Tn(Sri)= “good service provider” 
12.               elseif P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) ≤ 0.9 then 
13.                       Tn(Sri)= “very good service provider” 
14.               else 
15.                       Tn(Sri)= “ excellent service provider” 
16.          endif 
17. return Tn(Sri) 
18. end 
 
Upon the completion of the above functions, each service provider will be assigned a trust status 
based on its computed processing performance value. This trust status disseminates service provider’s 
processing performance during its service provisioning in the MEC network. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Simulation results of the proposed architecture are shown in section 3.1, while the efficiency and 
effectiveness of proposed scheme are discussed in section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents a comparison between the 
proposed architecture and some previous protocols.  
 
3.1.  Simulation results 
Simulation of the proposed model was performed using MATLAB program. Simulation setup:  
− five different service providers were considered, 𝑆𝑟𝑖 = {1,2,3,4,5}. 
− initial trust value for each 𝑆𝑟𝑖= zero.  
− all 𝑆𝑟𝑖 received the same number of job requests, in one job_type{Job3}, from various service users. 
− computation intervals = 5 (1 month duration each)  
− 𝑃𝐸1_T, 𝑃𝐸2_𝑇, 𝑃𝑇1_T, 𝑃𝑇2_T values: were assigned to each 𝑆𝑟𝑖 according to uniform random number 
generation per month.  
− hardware PC configuration = core i7, RAM 6 GB and hard disk 1 Tera.  
Trust evaluation was performed over the five months. 𝑆𝑟𝑖 is evaluated according to its processing 
performance in its predefined job type. The processing throughput PT(𝑆𝑟𝑖) results for each service provider 
per “m” month are shown in Figure 5. While the average processing success rate 𝑃𝐴𝑉 (𝑆𝑟𝑖) results are given 
Figure 6.  
Upon measuring the processing throughput and average success rate, the processing performance 
P(𝑆𝑟𝑖) is computed as presented in Figure 7 and the relevant trust status per 𝑆𝑟𝑖 over the five months, is 
shown in Table 3. Figure 8 reveals the processing incompliance (failure ratio) PI(𝑆𝑟𝑖) and Figure 9 shows the 
user termination ratio per 𝑆𝑟𝑖. Results show that service providers 1 and 2, trust status had improved 
gradually by time, because of their improvement in terms of processing throughput and average processing 
success rate over the five months. With this improve, processing incompliance and user termination ratio, had 
decreased as shown Figures 8 and 9. Service provider 3 trust status kept varying by time, within a good to 
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average range. While service provider 4 maintained its good trust status over the five months, however its 
processing incompliance acts as a major drawback as illustrated in Figure 8. Service provider 5, kept its 
excellent processing performance over the five months since its processing incompliance and user 
termination ratio are very low. Thus, simulation results could identify the processing performance of all five 
service providers, together with their processing incompliance and user termination ratios, showing their 
respective trust status. 
 
3.2.  Efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed architecture 
Analysis of the proposed architecture shows that the evaluation time is considerably low, due to the 
simplicity of the used equations. Processing performance evaluation and trust status results are updated 
periodically by CSM (fully trusted entity), which increases results credibility. In addition, maintaining a 
history record decreases service provider trust evaluation time, since it’s performed in an accumulative 
manner. A service provider is registered only once to the MEC network using its unique credentials. This 
encounters attacks such as fake or malicious service providers, who could deceive users by hiding their bad 
history.  
As the number of service providers increases, the proposed architecture could still distinguish each 
service provider using its assigned trust status and processing performance value. This validates service 
providers’ computational services trust level and history in the MEC network, which promotes for trusted and 
secured transactions. A service user is also given a recommendation list of available service providers to 
choose from, according to user’s computational requirements and preferences. 
 
3.3.  Comparison with previous protocols  
Table 4 shows a comparison of the proposed architecture evaluation parameters with previous 
works. The major limitations/discussion for each one of them. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Processing throughput per service provider 
 
Figure 6. Average processing success rate per 
service provider 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Processing performance per service provider 
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Table 3. Trust status per service provider in “m” months 
𝑆𝑟𝑖 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
𝑆𝑟1 Weak Weak Average Good Good 
𝑆𝑟2 Average Good Good Very good Very good 
𝑆𝑟3 Good Average Good Good Average 
𝑆𝑟4 Good Good Good Good Good 
𝑆𝑟5 Excellent Excellent Very good Very good Very good 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8. Processing incompliance per service provider 
 
Figure 9. Service providers’ user termination ratio 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of the proposed architecture and previous work 
Protocol 
Service Provider Assessed 
Parameters 
Evaluation 
Domain 
Trust Update 
Limitations/Discussion 
Static Dynamic 
[17] 
2018 
Security methods applied in 
terms of: i) authentication, ii) 
firewall systems; iii) 
encryption mechanisms, iv) 
intrusion detection 
Computation-
based 
√ 
 
 
Did not consider sudden attacks that could 
occur to a node, such as hacking. 
[18] 
2020 
Performance in terms of: 
-identity authentication 
-hardware capabilities 
-interactions’ behavior 
Reputation-
based 
(Direct/indirect 
trust) 
 √ Depended only on users’ opinions. 
Collusion attack may occur. 
[19] 
2018 
Performance in terms of: 
-identity authentication 
-capabilities (availability, 
response time, throughput, 
deployed hardware) 
-interactions’ behavior 
Feedback- 
based & 
computation-
based 
 Partial Trust computation is performed by an 
unknown entity, which makes trust results 
sharing difficult. 
Trust computation is complicated and time 
consuming. 
[20] 
2018 
Analyze traffic flows between 
two communicating entities. 
Computation-
based 
 √ No processing parameters are evaluated. 
Proposed 
Protocol 
2020 
Processing performance in 
terms of: 
-processing throughput 
-average processing success 
rate 
-processing incompliance 
-user termination ratio. 
Computation-
based 
 √ No human interaction involved, which 
guarantees results credibility. 
History capturing decreases computational 
overhead and limits re-register attack. 
Dynamic updating of results shows recent 
trust status of a service provider in the 
MEC network. 
Proposed a penalty system to track 
malicious entities. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Trust was evaluated by computing the processing performance of a service provider, through 
gaining its average processing success rate and processing throughput. However, processing incompliance 
and user termination ratio were computed, to accurately determine service providers’ performance in the 
MEC network. The proposed penalty system provided a close monitoring to the participating entities in the 
MEC network. By capturing the historical trust results, there is no need to evaluate a service provider trust 
status before the start of each interaction. Thus, gaining accurate and fair trust results with less computation 
overhead and minimal human interference. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5
P R O C E S S I N G  I N C O M P L I A N C E
Sr1 Sr2 Sr3 Sr4 Sr5
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5
U S E R  T E R M I N A T I O N  R A T I O
Sr1 Sr2 Sr3 Sr4 Sr5
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
 A trust evaluation scheme of service providers in mobile edge computing (Merrihan Badr Monir Mansour) 
2137 
Simulation results showed that, the higher average processing success rate and throughput, the better 
processing performance and trust status evaluation gained for a service provider. On the other hand, results 
illustrated that high processing incompliance or user termination ratio, are reflected in a low processing 
performance value for a service provider. Thus, maintaining service users’ reliability and securing future 
interactions in the MEC environment. For future work, we plan to evaluate service providers’ deployed 
hardware and software resources. In this context, security measures, scheduling algorithms, fault tolerant 
protocols deployed by a service provider should be considered during trust evaluation. On the other hand, the 
number and types of warnings imposed on a service provider, due to performing unauthorized actions should 
also be considered and analyzed in the future. Given that all acting entities are registered in the network 
through the network provider, a network provider could act as a cloud broker or even a service provider. On 
the other hand, a cloud broker could also act as a service provider. However, it will be recommended to 
review the trust evaluation parameters for these acting entities. 
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